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ECB - European Central Bank
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Latest releases on the ECB website - Press releases, speeches and interviews, press conferences.
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Adopting and investing in AI: evidence from euro area firms in the SAFE
This box presents new information about the adoption of, and investment in, artificial intelligence (AI) technologies by euro area firms, based on the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE). The findings reveal that large firms, listed or venture capital-backed companies and young firms are adopting AI more frequently. Firms using AI are more likely to expect an increase in turnover and investment in fixed assets compared with firms not using AI. Similarly, they plan to allocate larger shares of their investment to AI compared with non-users, indicating a reinforcing cycle of adoption and innovation. Ownership structure influences investment patterns, with listed or venture capital-backed companies leading early-stage adoption and privately owned firms dominating at more advanced stages.
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Assessing the impact of the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility on institutional quality: a Bayesian synthetic control approach
The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), launched in 2021, aims to promote long-term economic growth in EU Member States by incentivising structural reforms and investments. This paper explores a related supply-side transmission mechanism: improvements in institutional quality, as measured by the Worldwide Governance Indicators. Using a Bayesian synthetic control model and data up to 2024, we find robust and economically meaningful RRF-induced improvements in institutional quality in Italy. For other main RRF beneficiary countries, the evidence of such an effect ranges from suggestive to limited. We show that this cross-country variation is broadly consistent with the implementation of the national Recovery and Resilience Plans in terms of implementation speed and reform mix. While it is too early to draw firm policy conclusions, the findings lend support to the view that conditional, reform-linked financing instruments of the RRF type can improve institutional quality and, thereby, long-term growth prospects – provided that the reforms are well designed and effectively implemented.
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Global implications of export controls on rare earths: a model-based assessment
In April and in October 2025 China imposed export controls on rare earths amid escalating trade tensions with the United States. Although these measures were too short-lived to generate macroeconomic effects, they signalled China’s ability to draw on its dominant position in the rare earth supply chain. This paper provides a structured assessment of the potential macroeconomic consequences associated with rare earth supply disruptions. First, it documents that exposure to rare earth supply disruptions is concentrated in high-tech and security-sensitive sectors including automotive, electronics and defence-related industries. Second, drawing on earlier episodes of Chinese export restrictions on critical minerals (notably in 2010 and 2023), it highlights two key mitigating forces from the targeted countries’ perspective: practical and strategic constraints on China’s ability to implement strict export bans, and innovation-led substitution by targeted countries. Third, the paper quantifies the global macroeconomic implications of a hypothetical scenario of stringent but partial Chinese export restrictions on rare earths lasting for 18 months. To do so, the analysis combines, for the various segments of the transmission chain, a partial equilibrium setup, a closed-economy DSGE model, and the multi-country multi-sector dynamic model of Aguilar et al. (2026). The main results, across specifications, suggest estimated output losses for the United States ranging between 0.3% and 0.6%, with the largest impacts concentrated in automotive and electronics manufacturing. The results at the same time highlight the sensitivity of model-based estimates to assumptions on the substitutability of rare earths and the severity of restrictions.
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The Eurosystem’s comprehensive payments strategy
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From bricks to clicks: an assessment of euro area digital investment
This box provides a first assessment of digital investment trends in the euro area by using proxies derived from annual national accounts and monthly production data. As there is no standardised measurement framework, our definition of digital investment covers investment in buildings and structures in the information and communication sector, investment in ICT equipment and computer software and databases in the business economy, and investment in research and development in the information and communication sector. The proxy shows that there has been a gradual increase in digital investment, likely driven most recently by the surge in global demand for artificial intelligence (AI) technologies and cloud services. Looking ahead, the share of digital investment in overall business investment is expected to continue growing, supported, among other factors, by venture capital, Next Generation EU funding and the EU AI Continent Action Plan. However, survey results point to concerns that insufficient energy supply and overregulation could hamper further growth.
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How is trade policy uncertainty affecting euro area activity?
Trade policy uncertainty has risen sharply since late 2024 and remained at exceptionally high levels in 2025. This box investigates the implications of elevated trade policy uncertainty for euro area economic activity. It discusses the main transmission channels and shows that euro area sentiment tends to deteriorate when trade policy uncertainty rises. Empirical estimates suggest that the increase in trade policy uncertainty in 2025 weighed on euro area output and affected the manufacturing sector most significantly. Nevertheless, thanks to a number of offsetting factors, overall economic activity remained resilient.
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Severe weather and financial (in)stability
We quantify the effect of severe weather shocks on the US economy in an environment in which the economy can switch between periods of financial stability and financial instability, like the Great Recession. We estimate a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with banks and severe weather events. We show that severe weather shocks: 1) have a negative impact on real and financial US variables, sizable only in periods of financial instability, but muted effects on nominal variables; 2) are never a relevant source of business cycles fluctuations; 3) transmit mainly via a deterioration in the quality of capital.
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One market, one supervision - Rethinking the supervisory landscape for a truly integrated capital market in Europe
This paper provides an evidence-based assessment of the EU supervisory landscape by combining a comprehensive mapping of supervisory models and authorities with an analysis of capital market players across key sectors, including market infrastructures, asset management, and crypto-asset service providers. It documents a highly complex and fragmented supervisory architecture, characterised by a wide variety of national supervisory models and multiple authorities operating across the Union. While regulatory harmonisation through the Single Rulebook has progressed, supervisory responsibilities for capital market players remain largely national, with limited and uneven EU-level powers. This institutional fragmentation is increasingly misaligned with market realities, as capital markets have become more cross-border and integrated, albeit with important differences across sectors. The paper develops an analytical framework to assess options for a review of the EU capital markets supervisory architecture. Based on the sectoral mapping, it distils a few guiding principles for supervisory integration: a consistent approach based on common criteria (such as size and cross-border relevance) while accounting for sectoral specificities, and close cooperation between EU and national authorities. Finally, it conducts a sensitivity analysis around alternative degrees of supervisory integration and calibration criteria, and discusses the governance arrangements needed to make integrated supervision effective in practice. The analysis shows that a more integrated supervisory framework could deliver four key benefits: enhanced supervisory effectiveness, improved supervisory efficiency, reduced complexity and compliance burdens for firms operating across jurisdictions, and the removal of supervisory barriers that currently hinder the cross-border integration of EU capital markets.
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Where do the costs of higher US tariffs fall?
In this box, we show that exporters to the United States are, in aggregate, absorbing only a small fraction of the higher US tariffs. We document a wide range of responses to tariffs across country-sector pairs exporting to the US market. In addition, using product-level trade data, we show that US tariffs have led to a strong adjustment in imports, both across product categories and in overall volume. While tariffs are reshaping the geography of trade linkages, the associated costs are falling mostly on US importers and consumers.
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Synthetic, but how much risk transfer?
Banks use synthetic risk transfers (SRTs) to offload potential losses in their loan portfolios to non-bank investors while retaining the loans on their balance sheets. We investigate this trillion-euro market using transaction-level data from the euro area, the largest SRT market, and highlight three channels of potential risks to financial stability. First, we show that banks synthetically transfer loans that are capital-expensive relative to their riskiness. To establish causality, we exploit a regulation that causes a jump in the risk weights of loans without affecting their riskiness. As banks redeploy the freed capital, their loan portfolios become riskier relative to their capitalization. Second, after entering an SRT, banks reduce their monitoring efforts compared to other banks lending to the same firm. The reduction in monitoring is greater the larger the share of their firm exposure that banks synthetically transfer. Third, banks and non-bank investors are interconnected. Banks are more likely to sell SRTs to investors with whom they already have credit relationship.
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Securities losses and the bank collateral channel of monetary transmission
We show that losses on banks’ securities portfolios matter for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy even in the absence of financial stability concerns. When banks experience losses in their pledgeable securities, their ability to tap liquidity through the interbank market is impaired, and they subsequently reduce illiquid corporate lending, regardless of whether the securities were recorded at market or historical value. These effects are less pronounced for banks with abundant collateral and reserves and for banks that receive liquidity through their group’s internal capital market. Our results highlight a collateral channel in the bank-based transmission of monetary policy.
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Who to regulate? Identifying actors within DeFi’s governance
Decentralised Finance (DeFi) emerged in 2021 as a fast-growing crypto segment, attracting policymakers’ attention due to its innovative approach of delivering financial services without relying on centralised intermediaries. This paper assesses DeFi governance arrangements for regulating and supervising DeFi using a comprehensive dataset. We find that governance token holders of four protocols (Aave, MakerDAO, Ampleforth, Uniswap) are highly concentrated with around half or more holdings linked to the protocols themselves or exchanges. Top voters are mostly delegates, who, in many cases, could not be identified nor linked to token holders. The study offers insights for policymakers regarding the implementation of policy measures aimed at bringing relevant entities under the regulatory umbrella. The difficulty in identifying holders and voters using public data may make it hard to rely on some of the regulatory anchor points often put forward in the policy debate such as governance token holders, developers or centralised exchanges.
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A quantile probability model for sectoral corporate defaults in Europe
Conventional credit risk models understate tail risk by centering on mean default probabilities and neglecting distributional and sectoral heterogeneity. We propose a Quantile Probability of Default (QPD) framework based on unconditional quantile regressions estimated on flow default rates from five million non-financial firms across nine countries, conditioned on macro- and sectoral scenario covariates standard in stress testing. The tail exhibits three- to five-fold stronger sensitivity than at the median, revealing non-linearities and asymmetric sectoral propagation of credit risk. We validate the performance of our model across crisis periods and benchmark models to confirm the framework’s robustness and prudential efficiency. Under the European Central Banks’s 2025 increasing geopolitical and trade tensions scenario, the QPD identifies higher tail vulnerabilities in construction, trade, hospitality, and real estate. The framework embeds distributional estimation into stress testing, advancing scenario-based assessment of sectoral credit risk for policy and prudential applications.
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Digital banking and the evolving monetary policy transmission
This paper maps the euro-area digital-banking segment and assesses how digital banks transmit monetary policy relative to brick-and-mortar peers. I compile a hand-checked universe of over 170 digital banks (2016–2025) from supervisory data, classifying institutions by business model (e-retail, e-service, e-wholesale). Digital banks are small on average yet growing fast, rely more on household deposits—predominantly overnight—and hold larger cash buffers and intangibles than traditional banks. Using a difference-in-differences design around the ECB tightening cycle that began in July 2022 and the initial 2024 easing. Three results stand out. (i) The funding channel is stronger and faster at digital banks in tightening: household deposit rates rise more and retail-funding spreads compress less, especially at overnight maturities and for stand-alone digital banks. Corporate-funding results are directionally similar but weaker and less robust. (ii) Loan-rate pass-through is not stronger, implying margin compression and a later slowdown in lending growth at digital banks despite continued retail inflows. Household deposits are markedly more rate-sensitive than corporate or unsecured funding. (iii) In early easing, digital banks cut new funding rates relatively quickly —particularly at longer maturities — yet effective deposit premia persist and retail inflows soften while margins begin to normalise. Policy implications concern the interaction of market digital adoption and banks’ capacity to adjust balance-sheet duration through the monetary cycle, along with financial stability.
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Repo market networks: dynamics under financial stress
The smooth functioning of the repo market is essential to financial stability. However, the market has faced repeated episodes of stress in recent years. This paper examines the resilience of the euro-denominated repo market during recent episodes of elevated financial stress, drawing on transaction-level data and applying network analysis. The institutional repo network displays a core–periphery structure, with connectivity intensifying during stress periods. At the sectoral level, trading volumes and repo spreads remain broadly stable. For the euro repo market as a whole, financial stress is associated with lower spreads, consistent with the interpretation that the market functions as a shock absorber.
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